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The Poor Kid
Jonathan Weiss*
Juvenile law and lore present a series of real contradictions. An
enormous mound of articles deal with the field, but there are only two
Supreme Court cases directly on the question of juvenile rights in the
juvenile court process.' We have been exhorted time and time again to
trust the state as a "loving parent" who has the child's best interests at
heart. But many scholars have documented the horrors that a juvenile
actually experiences in the state's dealings with him.2 Some judges too
have recognized these horrors.3
The purpose of this piece is not to detail the unfortunate treatment
of juveniles, but rather to trace the stages of the system as they impinge
upon infants and the young, as defined by the appropriate, juvenile
court statute, and to analyze what existing practices mean and how they
(probably) affect many of those individuals caught up in the juvenile
process. This writer will also suggest how the process could be made to
serve the ostensible goals of society.
The central thesis is based on a present-day fact-state treatment of a
child in juvenile proceedings is frightening and bewildering. Therefore,
it will be argued first that, contrary to the widespread theory, controls
over the process should be extremely tight; in this respect, this writer
agrees with those who maintain that the Constitution applies in such
proceedings and children have constitutional rights. The second aspect
of the thesis is that the process itself should be intelligible to the child;
that it should be clearly explained to him so he can deal with it
meaningfully and profit from it.
* B.A., Yale 1960; LL.B. Yale Law School, 1963; Director of Columbia University's
Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law; Consultant-PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIvIL
DIsTuRBANcEs; Consultant-JOINT COMMISSION ON THE MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This report in
no way pretends to be exhaustive or representative in selection of cases and materials. The
articles in footnote 2 and the citations in Gault can provide both. The selection here is for
illustration, since few juvenile court decisions are reported.
2. The leading work in the field was written by Francis A. Allen, Dean of Michigan
Law School: The Borderland of Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. Scl. REV. 107; later in book
form. Univ. of Chicago Press (1964). See also Elrod and Melaney, Juvenile Justice: Treat-
ment of Travesty, 11 u. PiTr. L. REV. 277 (1949). For general surveys, see Comment,
Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (1966); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1966); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in
the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967); Note, District of Columbia Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings: Apprehension to Disposition, 49 GEo. L.J. 322 (1960).
3. See note 78 infra.
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The author's main experience with juveniles is as a neighborhood
lawyer in a Negro slum in Washington, D.C. and Hell's Kitchen in New
York. I have sat in waiting rooms; interviewed in every place D.C.
puts children and in the barred rooms of New York; been to the homes;
dealt with the judges and all other workers of the court; and arranged
for social workers. This report cannot convey the tragic waste I have
seen, nor communicate the overwhelming sense of frustration about
facilities, the nature of the system and the effects on personal develop-
ment at stake in the juvenile process. What it can do, however, is to
trace the archetypical outlines of the juvenile's experience and suggest
how it affects him and his future.
In re Gault,4 the first Supreme Court case dealing directly with
Juvenile Court procedures, established four constitutional commands
that a juvenile court must follow. In a proceeding that could lead to
deprivation of liberty, it must:
a) give adequate notice,
b) advise or right to counsel (including assigned counsel),
c) offer the right to remain silent, and
d) offer the right to confront accusers, cross-examine adverse-wit-
nessess and exclude improperly taken confessions.
And in March of 1970, the Supreme Court in In Re Winship5 extended
the Constitutional guarantee of the burden of proof-beyond a reason-
able doubt-to juvenile trials.
Assuming that Supreme Court decisions are to be carried out in a
meaningful way, it is still clear that these commands will not generate
control over the process in general nor safeguard all rights of due
process and tender treatment. And what are the patterns of treatment
of juveniles?
I. TAKING A CHILD INTO CUSTODY
Summons
A child's first confrontation with the state's power takes place when
he is summoned before an official. A child is normally summoned by
means of letter addressed to his parents.6 By this letter, the state has
4. Supra note 1; see also, Cohill article supra at 575.
5. Supra note I; Cohill article supra at 577.
6. An estimate based on my files of actual cases would indicate that this is by far the
most common procedure. It is generally done by "intake workers" of the court. See Note,
Juvenile Delinquents, supra note 2.
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intruded into the family. A letter, no matter how it is worded, implies
that the family is not adequately supervising and nurturing the child.
Yet parents feel intensely about children and their freedom to raise
them as they want.7 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that one
of the most crucial, private decisions is whether and when to have
children.8 Children are reasons for marriage; they are fulfillment or
attempts to fulfill dreams; they are the center of some people's universe.
Many judge people by how their children behave, mature, produce.
The choice, the child's growth, the subsequent involvement in the
child's growth, clearly portrays the intense and deeply rooted entwine-
ment of this relationship. The decision defines a family. Success by
the child may satiate a parent's thwarted ambition, and children may
be the major achievement of a person's life. Moreover, many believe
that the family is a special separate unit, and that it is sacred. Outside
advice, let alone intrusion, is bitterly and often justly resented. None-
theless, a letter can summon parents and child to a moral lecture.
Often the spectacle is of a middle-class white police officer or social
worker lecturing a poor non-white family. 9 The morality and advice
imposed is often very particular, relating to cleanliness, sexuality, social
life, etc.10
7. The Supreme Court has often emphasized this right. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923), the Court spoke of the parental freedom to provide foreign language
training. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), explicitly affirmed parental rights
to choose schools and explicitly denied a complete perpetual in locus parentis position
to the state. "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations." at 535. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 158,
165-67 (1944); Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1942); People v. Ewer,
141 N.Y. 129, 36 N.E. 4 (1948). West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
upheld parental rights to instruct children not to engage in a ritual. See Weiss, Privilege,
Posture and Protection, "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 609-612 (1964). In Arm-
strong v. Manzo 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), a case dealing with adoption, the necessity for
a hearing before termination of parental rights was considered a constitutional require-
ment. See also Farrington v. Tokishege, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927); May v. Anderson, 345
US. 528 (1953); Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes In-
volving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151-70 (1963). With these rights so important and
hearings a necessity, the act of invasion of parental rights would seem to require extremely
tight safeguards.
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. Such has been this lawyer's experience, and one that is common.
10. For an example of a reversal of a juvenile court order to go to sunday school see
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946). Precisely the problem of in-
trusion into religious freedom treated there is rampart in situations where administrative
officials are allowed to dictate particularized morality. For possible constitutional infirmi-
ties in such an operation see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Clancy v. Weiss,
The Concientious Objector Exemption Problems in Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional
Considerations, 17 MAINE L. REv., 143, 155-6 (1965); Weiss, Book Review, 72 YA"E L.J.
1665, 1669-70 (1963).
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Middle-class morality may be singularly inappropriate. It is foreign
to the ethnic groups which form distinct sub-cultures and put forth
such movements as "Black is beautiful." Leaving aside the desirability
of cultural diversity and the Constitutional sanctity of personal beliefs,
it is generally agreed that the best psychology is to encourage pride in
family traditions and self-reliant independence about actions and
principles. The state confronts a set of individual rights at this juncture,
particularly the parents' freedom to raise the children and the felt
sanctity of a family home. One may also suggest a future retrospective
right on the behalf of the child to have been raised by his own parents,
and the rights of any individual generally to be free from the state's
interference except when dangerous to others.
Who sends the letter which threatens the very nature of the family's
autonomy and effects an intrusion? By and large it is the social workers
and the police.." They are not supervised in this major step,' 2 nor are
there any standards of proof of trouble that must be met.'8 And to date,
there are no guides to prevent intrusion into privacy.'4 A tremendous
variety of people have been empowered by the state to intrude into
the family. The basis of such vast power rests on a wide range of
possible facts and claims about families, character, feelings, and
opinions-a large delegation into a very delicate area. Several school
teachers, hospital workers (aides), workers around Juvenile Court can
all participate in referring or causing official letters inquiring into how
the child "appears" morally or psychologically; and once isolated for
focused inquiry, acts take on strange overtones in the eyes of the
beholder. Reactions by observers trigger intrusions by the government.
Detention
On the other hand, a child may first feel the force of the state at the
hand of police. No legal consensus as to proper procedures, labels or
controls has ever been reached. Are juveniles arrested, or "detained,"
or what? Often police, security guards, and others are given broader
powers to detain children than they normally possess for adults. 5
11. See WALTHER AND MCCUNE, SOCIALIZATION PRINCIPLES AND WORK STYLES OF THE
JUVENILE COURT (Geo. Washington Univ. 1965), for the usual gloss on this fact.
12. There is no real supervision in this author's experience.
13. See note 10 supra. See also Wallace and Brennan, Intake and the Family Court, 12
BUFF. L. REV. 442 (1963).
14. See note 10 supra. See also Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 J. FvmuLY L. 139
(1962).
15. E.q., In re Williams, 259 N.YS.2d 91, 49 Misc. 2d 154 (1966).
593.
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Courts have decided that juveniles may be arrested and held for ap-
pearance on information and belief alone.'6 Yet whether an actual
arrest has been made is not always clear.17 Parents have no way of
knowing what an arrest means or why the police believe their child
needs extra controls; for the child it is an ambiguous and frightening
act of authority.
The rationale for not considering "a stopping" an arrest is based on
any one of a number of grounds: Arrest records are bad; 18 juvenile law
is not a "criminal" process; 19 there may be times when we want to
empower people to transport juveniles to their homes-bringing home
an eight-year-old wandering late at night in a strange neighborhood
may relieve both family and child.
On the other hand, there are powerful reasons for considering a
detention an arrest when allegedly associated with a law violation.
Police conduct needs regulation.2 0 If there is no arrest, arrest standards
do not apply and possibly no suits for false arrest lie. We, therefore,
lack means to control arbitrariness and excess of force on impression-
able youth and thereby lose one sanction against abuses. What other
sanctions remain to make sure the "police must obey the law while
16. E.q., In re Anonymous, 238 N.Y.S.2d 892, 57 Misc. 2d 827 (1962).
17. See, e.q., R. Myren and L. Swanson, Police Work with Children 3536 (US. Dept.
of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau Publication #399-1962. See also
the discussion in State ex rel. Heth v. Moloney, 186 N.E. 362 (1933).
18. Juvenile arrest records themselves often lead to many difficulties. Much noise is
made about secrecy. See, e.g., Gough, Sealing of Juvenile Records: A Clean Slate? ! SANTA
CLARA LAw. 119 (1963). But see, Anonymous v. New York City Transit Authority, 167
N.Y.S.2d 715, 4 App. Div. 2d 953, afj'd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 769 (1959); Adler v. Lang, 21 App.
Div. 2d 107, 249 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1964); Contra, Manigo v. New York City Housing Author-
ity, 273 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 51 Misc. 2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1966); aff'd without opinion, 279 N.Y.S.2d
1014 (1967).
19. E.g., In re Holmes, 265 Pa. 549, 109 A.2d 523 (1954). Cf. Musmanno's dissent, Id.
at 520. For the ancient cliches, see Ex parte Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (1920).
20. See generally, Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69
YALE L.J. 543 (1960). For judicially recognized judicial abuses see e.g., In re Gregory W.,
19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966); In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966). The
author has had clients arrested in school by Juvenile Officers and carried out hanging
from their belts in front of their classmates; 16 year old girls beaten and arrested for
assault (dismissed at trial following two weeks preliminary detention after the officer's
testimony); and arrested for talking to another detained juvenile. He has had clients
arrested for allegedly stealing a 10 cent package of Kool-Aid in 100-degree weather; for
sleeping in a car when he couldn't get home; and for being found on a classmate's bike.
By arrest, detention and interrogation in a police station is meant. And after arrest he
has interviewed clients behind bars and in New York in Juvenile Court in a little room
with all other juveniles present. Needless to say, not only was their no confidentiality but
also no confidence when matters like rape accusations were discussed (dismissed eventually
in this instance). (These examples come from a personal file kept by the author). See,
for an example of brutal police approach to juveniles, Hoover, Juvenile Delinquency or
Youthful Criminality, 15 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 660 (1964). See text accompanying notes 47-52
infra.
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enforcing the law"21 and that their treatment of juveniles is proper?
Justice Murphy once asserted, "but one remedy exists to deter viola-
tions of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which excludes
illegally obtained evidence." 22 That, he said, is the only way to prevent
this "shabby business; lawlessness by officers of the law." 23 Yet, because
the detention is not labeled an arrest, various admissions made after
detention, which would be kept out of an adult's trial, are not excluded
in the case of children. 24 No effective way of controlling police conduct
at the moment seems available. If the point of juvenile treatment is to
protect the child, enabling the man in blue to do whatever he wants
hardly seems the best way to effectuate the goal.2 5
What follows an arrest may be terrifying to the child. For a minor
example, consider that "(N)o state . . . prohibits fingerprinting in
juveniles in all instances" and in some states fingerprinting is done no
matter what the cause of detention.2 6 A child's hand is pressed in ink
and then on paper ten times (in the normal case). This treatment is
one which many children associate with criminals and is done, of
course, in official surroundings. No effort is made to assess the psy-
chological impact, and no judicial safeguards or requirements have to
be met. Police stations are not designed to soothe children, nor are the
interrogations. If adults tremble after arrest, picture the plight of
children and juveniles. Examples of traumas are not difficult to con-
jure. But rather than pause to reflect on their myriad manifestations,
let us consider the especial institutionalized traumatic experience.
21. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). citing Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315. 320-21 (1951). As an implicit forerunner of Gault on the necessity for making
sure counsel is available, Blackburn held that where a defendant (here a little deranged)
is unable to defend himself, the court must "assign counsel for him as necessary requisite
of due process of law," citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, (1932).
22. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at 46.
24. See, e.g., In re Williams, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Fam. Ct. 1966) (confession excluded on
other grounds); Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958). Gault presumably
will have impact here. See In re Rutane, 234 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Fain. Ct. 1962).
25. Seen note 20 supra. See also Comment, The Juvenile Offender and Self-Incrimina-
tion, 40 WASH. L. REV. 189 (1965).
26. Friker, The Fingerprinting of Juveniles, 43 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 144, 150 (1966). That
author is in favor of fingerprinting as a means of locating youth who need help. Cf.
Myren & Swanson, note 17 supra at 84-89. A fingerprinted child regardless of presence of
fingerprints at a crime is probably more liable for arrest. See Friker, supra. Gault, as if
this issue were before the Court (which it was not), reserved opinion on the practice. 387
U.S. at 49 n.83.
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II. TEMPORARY DETENTION
After the initial confrontation, many officials have the power to
confine children in places of temporary detention, a matter on which
Gault was "explicitly" silent.27 A typical statute is the Juvenile Court
Law of Allegheny County which reads in part:
Upon the filing of any petition... or upon information charging
a child with any indictable offense or with the violation of any
other laws of this Commonwealth or the ordinance of any city,
borough or township, or the commitment of a child by any
magistrate, alderman or justice of the peace, the judge holding the
juvenile court shall . . . make all necessary orders for compelling
the production of such child... [and] Pending the final disposition
of any case, the child shall be subject to the order of the court [and]
may be ordered by the court to be kept and maintained in some
place provided by the county for such purposes... 2 s
With this statute, it is possible to place a child in detention pending
final disposition, and the judicial signature may be merely a pro forma
routine. The same is true in the District of Columbia.29 In the District
of Columbia the only subsequent requirement for further confinement
is a judicial signature which of course is often pro forma.30 Lawyers' in
the District of Columbia maintain that there often is no signature at
all, or only much later. The court keeps the records and only when
lawyers insist upon examining them, does there seem to be compliance.
The signature could well be made by rubber stamp-all that exists is
the order and the report of the intake worker with the alleged reasons
for confinement or an appraisal of the correctness of the decision.
There is no ex parte hearing on the matter. The judge consults neither
child nor parent and does not inform them of his reasons, or of the
implications of his decisions. Although trials are supposed to follow
rapidly, a month is the fastest (jury demands take the longest time)
and six months is not uncommon.
27. 387 U.S. at 13.
28. Act of June 3, 1933, P.L. 1449, § 405, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11
§ 269 (1965).
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2306(c) (1967).
In the District of Columbia, a child arrested three times no matter what allegations or
what the resulting previous decisions is sent by police practice to the place of detention.
The same automatically occurs when a parent claims the child is "beyond control."
30. In the District of Columbia, it is almost always signed (never with a hearing).
About a month elapses before a hearing is held and then the recommendation by an
intake worker is followed. Before a trial occurs a child may spend up to six months in
the Receiving Home. The author has had clients detained two or three months, released
only after habeas corpuses were employed.
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. And what sort of places are juveniles "temporarily" detained in?
Judge Bazelon notes one description:
... Jesse Elmore alleges that he is being held in a "terrible jail."
He states that he is kept under lock and key, behind bars, and in
occasional solitary confinement; that this "jail" lacks doctors or
psychiatrists, and does not afford even a minimal program of
guidance of instruction; that he is "suffering from irremediable
harm every moment of detention." Jesse Elmore is thirteen years
old. The... "terrible jail" is the Juvenile Receiving Home.81
And they do look like jails. In the District of Columbia, the doors are
always kept locked. There are bars on the windows. The permanent
population ranges around two hundred inmates, four or five to a room.
James Symington, former Chairman of the President's Commission on
Juvenile Delinquency, reported the outrage. The conditions, he says,
are unspeakable.
The facilities provided are even worse. For "school" there is but a
one-room classroom for all ages. There are nurses, and a doctor who
visits, but no attached medical unit. There are no psychiatrists attached.
A quick glance at the book one signs to get admitted -will show
practically no visits by social workers. There is one facility known as
"isolation." It is solitary confinement and children can be placed there
by guards for infractions such as talking back or talking after the lights
have gone out for sleep. The "Home" is ill lit, the guards are surly,
the food smells bad-it is "a terrible jail." Lawyers have to get the
court's permission, however, to visit a client there. Children are
transported to and from this place in cars with grills, handcuffed,
guarded by police. The juvenile court itself has a cell block where boys
are kept for hours awaiting trial in a room equipped with bars and
urinals. The conditions in the Allegheny County juvenile home,
located in the Oakland district of Pittsburgh, are only somewhat im-
proved.
What legal controls are currently exercised over "temporary deten-
tion"? Only the "discretion" which permeates the system. There are
three constitutional bases for believing external and clear controls
rather than juvenile court "discretion" should be exercised. The first
is the right to bail. Judge Holtozoff in an excellent decision, Trimble
31. Elmore v. Stone, 335 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Clayton v. Stone, 358 F.2d
549 (D.C. Cir. 1966) both cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23 n.30. See D.C. Crime Com-
mission Infra at 34, a5 665-75.
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v. Stone, 2 held that such a right exists for juveniles. The second right
is to a fair hearing prior to deprivation of liberty. In the District of
Columbia, for example, a person allegedly insane and potentially a
danger to himself and the community has a right to a hearing before
being subject to confinement. 3 The rationale is clear-liberty is both
a right and an advantageous condition for an individual. To allow
arbitrary or unsupervised action to take it away is to sanction the sys-
tematic violation of rights and infliction of injury. The same reasoning
applies even more strongly to juveniles, since they are more impres-
sionable,84 and less able to cope with the oppression of confinement. (In
addition, they are also presumably less dangerous in most cases). The
third right is to receive handling and classification related to the
purpose of the act. Practically all juvenile statutes require provision of
a place of detention equivalent to a normal, good home and all refer
to the ostensibly rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court process. Yet,
as we have stated, places of "temporary" detention are "terrible jails."
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a case
Creek v. Stone,38 unfortunately mooted by delays by Counsel, has com-
mented on this problem. The Court stated that the juvenile court
should inquire into a claim that the place of "temporary" detention
was inappropriate for the juvenile, and that a review of the resulting
judgment could be had on habeas corpus36 It is important to note that
two courts are basically empowered to investigate conditions. The
juvenile court if it is to fulfill its functions, must explore the issue.
32. 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.C. 1960). Substantially in accord, State v. Franklin, 12 So. 2d
211 (1943); Angue v. Boyd, 121 A. 678 (1923). Df. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
33. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See also Ex Parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201
181 F.2d 811 (1947); Justice Spiegel's decision on confining addicts, In re James, reported
the N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1967, at 1, col. 1. See for recent developments Lake v. Cameron,
364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Cameron
v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967); On the general right to hearings, see Anderson
National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944.); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518, 581 (1819); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 191 (1902).
34. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRiCr OF COLUMBIA 676-86 (1966).
35. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For an allied point on vagueness
see Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 67 (1960).
36. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 110 (D.C. Cri. 1967). For a conceptual analogue see
the classification for reasonable statutory purpose cases, e.g. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US.
479 (1960). "[t]he means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained" Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1924). Recently, in Fulwood
v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the US. Court of Appeals directed the Juvenile
Court to follow the statutory command to inquire into appropriate disposition for the
child's best interests.
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The Greek case and its sucessors are the farthest any court has yet,
gone in recognizing the statutory, implications of aid, not trauma, in
the area of preliminary detention. In other jurisdictions preliminary
detention, regardless of lack of hearing and possible damage to the
child, has been approved.37 The alleged justification is that the state
stands in the role of a parent and is concerned with the child's
welfare.38 But let us remember what has been done at this point-prior
to any trial or consideration of the need for detention or treatment,
parental rights and the child's -right to parental custody have been.
abruptly terminated. What a parent can't lose in adoption without a
hearing and notice,39 he can lose "temporarily" due to the decision of
any number of petty officials of the state to detain his child. A juvenile
who, presumably, in most cases is less of a threat to the community than
a madman or a criminal, is deprived of his liberty without the safe-
guards surrounding the procedures. Finally, a juvenile is placed in an
institution, with no specific attempt to find what effect it has on him.
Such a system is inconsistent with the purposes and claims of the
juvenile court movement.
III. THE COURT EXPERIENCE
The process of arrest, interview and detention are all serious matters.
Whether these delicate areas of discretion be traumatic or controlled,
if formal inquiry is to be made, the juvenile is next subjected to a court
experience.
There are three types of proceedings:
1. Those inquiring into an allegation that a law violation has oc-
curred,
2. those inquiring into an allegation of "delinquency,"
3. those inquiring into an allegation that a child is beyond control
of his parents.
We will deal with each in turn.
Allegation of Criminal Act
Juvenile courts appear to work on the principle that the procedure of
a criminal trial is a very poor way to discover whether a particular act
37. E.g. in re Florance, 47 Cal. 2d 25, 300 P.2d 825 (1956).
38. Id. at 28, 300 P.2d 827.
39. Armstrong v. Manzo, .380 U.S. 545. (1965). Seenote 6 supra,
599
Duquesne Law Review
was in- fact committed, although presumably'the court in a criminal
trial wants the answer also. Consequently, criminal procedures to focus
the inquiry are largely abandoned. Yet this abandonment is without
specific consideration of the needs of juveniles in general or of the
particular juveniles enmeshed in the process.
It used to be that the proof in juvenile cases was only by the pre-
ponderance. In Re Winship changed that.40 A basic rationale for this
higher burden can be found since we do presume children to be in-
nocent, particularly if we claim this is no trial for crime. This pre-
sumption is part of the reason for the high burden of proof (and has
been voluntarily followed by the Allegheny County Juvenile Court
since 1965). As experienced lawyers know, particularly those dealing
with law violations, the truth is very hard to ascertain. In civil litigation
judgments must be rendered on the "preponderance" of evidence since
one of the two (or more) parties must win. In juvenile proceedings,
where a decision not to do anything may be made, the findings of fact
required to justify a decision to do something as serious as detention
should be kept to high standards of truth to insure its veracity. The law
in civil matters exists in large part to settle disputes, and it makes sense
to have every dispute resolvable by a decision, particularly when it deals
only with property, not with who shall be free to deal with property.
But in areas such as criminal law (or involuntary commitment), where
the normal presumption is in favor of the liberty and against any
societal intervention, the decision to remove an individual from society
is justly held to strict standards. In juvenile law, where we should
assume more high spirits and accidents than with adults (or less vicious
mentality), and where the consequences are more serious than in
criminal law, and where parental rights are threatened, the case for a
heavy burden of proof seemed even clearer. The protections from
sanctions and the presumption for liberty indicates the necessity for
putting those who want to employ state control to a higher burden of
proof before they can invade the family and affect the child as he
grows. Particularly should this be the case where there will be specific
reponses based on the specific acts and circumstances to be proved i.e.
depositions based on "proven" crimes. Moreover, as is becoming in-
40. E.g. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 878, 241, P.2d 631 (1952); In re Schubert,
153 Cal. App. 2d 138, 3131 P.2d 968 (1957); In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Ct. App.
1964). But see, Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 385 S.E.2d 444 (1946); In re Madik,
233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931). In re Urbasek, Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization, .385 U.S. 276 at 286 (1966). - .
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creasingly evident, a juvenile court finding imposes a sanction and a
criminal stigma.41 The particular finding is also often crucial. A
finding of a "felony" will prevent later hiring, military service, and
result in subsequent proceedings and higher bail42 than a finding of a
"misdemeanor." Courts with this in mind sometimes change the
finding of a "felony" to "misdemeanor." 43 The policy behind this
ad hoc protection is now better served by an initial higher burden of
proof.
Other safeguards for veracity fall. Courts have held that unlike the
rules in the ordinary criminal cases, there is no necessity for corrobora-
tion in finding of arson 44 or conviction based only on a confession since
the proceeding is not criminal.45 So while an adult cannot be convicted
on a child's uncorroborrated testimony because of its untrustworthi-
ness,4 6 decisions as to treatment of impressionable youth and which affect
parental rights will be based on it. The issue of admissibility of con-
fessions has been mainly resolved by Gault's47 requirements of adult
standards.
If the function of juvenile law is to protect the child, there should
be serious inquiry as to whether we want to allow any interrogation.
The Supreme Court has stated that one goal in trying to limit coerced
confessions is the "preservation of the individual's freedom of will," 48
and has held that "(a)ny questioning by police officers which in fact
produces a confession which is not the product of a free intellect renders
that confession inadmissible." 49 But the essential point here is the effect
of interrogation on the young person and the forcing of a confession
41. See note 2 supra. See also, In re Mikklesen, 225 Cal. App. 2d 467, 38 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1964).
42. The author in arguing for bail has often run across the juvenile arrest record as
a reason for bail or higher bail and unsuccessfully moved to strike its citation. In re
Tyrone Hurt (D.C. Ct. App., unreported Oct. 1965).
43. In re Schubert, 153 Cal. App. 2d 138, 313 P.2d 968 (1957).
44. E.g. Robinson v. State, 204 S.W.2d 981 (1947) (dictum).
45. In re Rutane, 234 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Fain. Ct. 1962); Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d
458 (5th Cir. 1958); But see People v. Fitsgerald, 244 N.Y. 307 (1927); In re Coyle, 101
N.E.2d 192 (1951).
46. E.g. N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 392 (McKinney 1958); People v. Klein, 266
N.Y. 188 (per curiam).
47. Supra note 1.
48. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1950).
49. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1963). See also, Hansford v. United States,
365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. O'Neill, 62 Cal. 2d 748, 401 P.2d 928 (1965). Note
that such a holding gives a defense attorney two go rounds in an adult case with an
insanity defense. First he raises the problem of mental capacity for the confession and then
as a defense. Gary Bellow. has done this successfully in the District of Columbia. Gault
recognizes the problem of capacity, 387 U.S. at 44-46.
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from him.5 0 If the state is trying to aid the child, is it not clear that it is
a bad thing to allow police to browbeat children into confessions?51
Take for example the extreme recent case of Gregory W.52 On a victim's
description of a strong twenty-year-old attacker police picked up
twelve-year-old Gregory. After repeated quizzing and coaching, he
produced a confession that suited the facts. The police then found out
that during the time the crime was committed he had been in a
security ward. Undaunted, they went to his place of confinement and
interrogated anew. A confession describing his breaking out was
produced. The highest court in New York finally ordered the confes-
sion excluded over a dissent that said it was clear the child needed
custodial care. Gregory was schizophrenic. One doubts that any doctor
would consider his experience therapeutic. Similar stories can be un-
covered almost without end.53 A parade of horrors does not prove that
any type of interrogation is wrong, but it does suggest that we may want
to prevent any entries into interrogation, for the inch of inquiry may be
transformed into a mile of pain. The presence of adult inquiry is
threatening and probably traumatic-a child is more likely to be
coerced out of his rights (and view the law, therefore, not as procedures
with safeguards but as a provider of threatening interviewers). Until
lawyers are assigned to advise and accompany as soon as the state's
agents deal with the child, he is unlikely to understand or truthfully
respond to any questions. The fact of questions is a threat; the ex-
perience may-be traumatic, leading to error which damns or to reaction
which damages, and it may allow an expansion into brutality. If
juvenile process protects, then it must prevent unsupervised interroga-_
tion of children. While Gault makes some "confessions" inadmissible
in juvenile proceedings, it does not prevent the general practice of
interrogation with its probably harmful effects on the child. Neither
Gault nor any other case offers criteria or supervision to deal with
harm to children other than the abstract harm of involuntariness and
the evidendiary harm of unreliability.
An inquiry into mens rea or possession of a clear intent to do
50. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (no majority opinion). See also, Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961), a 25-year late reversal of a confession conviction of a retarded 19
year old.
'51. Some social workers think confession is good for the soul. If so, the therapeutic
criteria and context should be defined, not left to police.
52. In re Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966). The court, as noted in
Gault, did reverse the conviction.
: 53.- In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225, A.2d 110 (1966); United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp.
160 (1964); In re Rutane, 234 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Farn. Ct. 1962).
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"wrong" is often precluded. 54 Once again an argument can be made
that such a departure from the rules of criminal law is wrong from the
point of view of the basic purposes of juvenile law. Certain acts surely
have different meanings depending on intent and understanding of the
moral nature of the act. The reason we have juvenile courts is to be
able to inquire specifically into the relation between a child and the
surrounding events. The degree and nature of his intent is certainly
relevant to decide what "act" was perpetrated and by what sort of
child.55
.Juries are generally not permitted. 6 Hearsay is generally admitted.57
It is not the scope of this article to justify these devices as a truth
preserver, but juries allow precise framing of issues for appellate review,
human response, and the exclusion of misleading evidence. Even in
civil matters, hearsay is excluded because of its misleading nature. All
this argues for these rights to serve juvenile law policy. 58
Gault establishes the right to counsel,6s although without creating a
system for effectively informing frightened youths of this possibility.
But is counsel enough? Practice in a juvenile court is bewildering not'
only because nearly all the normal procedural safeguards are missing,
but also because the whole system is confused in format.60 Gault pre-
54. Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally, Westbrook,
Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. LAw. 121 (1965). See note 49 supra for procedural
impact, since insanity is related to mens rea; see, Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the "Insanity
Delense"--Why not? 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1964).
55. The question is capacity to form evil ideas. What degree of sophistication is avail-
able, etc.? In assessing the act the personal comprehension. and moral understanding can,
help an examination of actual and moral errors. See Time, Aug. 25, 1967, at 51, for one
juvenile judge's search for mens rea in young glue sniffers.
56. ,E.g. Ex parte Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (1920); In re Lambert, 86 A.2d
411 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1952) aff'd, In re Lambert, 203 F.2d 607 (1953), construing the
one statute authorizing juries so as not to furnish them. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14
(1967).
57. See U. PA. L. Rv. Comment, note 2 supra for a thorough analysis. But see, In re
Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953). Gault presumably has changed all this.
See In re Gault, 387 US. at 56-57 (1967). See also, Note, Farm's Appeal, in this symposium.
58. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra. The virtues of jury appeals leading to law
formulation rests in part on the common law commitment to stare decisis. See, Weiss,
An Analysis of Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 67 (1955).
59. See for salutory effect of counsel, Ketcham, Legal. Renaissance in the Juvenile
Courts, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 585, 595 (1965); Matthews and Weiss, What Can Be Done: A.
Neighborhood Lawyer's Credo, 47 B.U.L. REv. 231, 237-8 (1967). For pre Gault horrors
(some affirming, some reversed) see In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952);
In re Custody of a Minor, 250 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957); In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d
266 (1966); Evan v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C.
Mum. Ct. App. 1953); Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 399, 264 P. 718 (1928); For an example
of a child shuffled from lawyer to lawyer by a court, see United States v. Madsen, 148
F. Supp. 625 (D. Alaska, 1957).
60. Such has been the author's experience. See generally, Hon. John F. Malloy,
Juvenile Court-A Labyrinth of Confusion for the Lawyer, 4 Aiuz. L REv. 1 (1962). Con-
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sumably helps in establishing the right to notice;61 but the full requi-
sites of notice have not been articulated. Recently, the District of
Columbia has applied Gault to one of the practices there. The existing
practice was to charge a juvenile with a number of acts and then ask
a jury or a judge to find out whether the child was "involved." The
local Court of Appeals held that more specificity is required and there
must be a finding as to whether or not the child committed the acts
alleged.62 In the absence of such interpretations of Gault the lawyer is
presented with little knowledge of what is at stake in a trial and
cannot guide his client effectively, as it is difficult to know what sort
of proof is required or to frame precise issues.
Allegation of Delinquency
The second category of proceedings is an allegation of "delin-
quency." There the legal questions are still more confused. It is not
clear from case law whether there exists a category of delinquency
separate from law violations6 3 whether it is proved by one or more
law violations,6 4 or whether it rests on an assessment of past proven
law violations. A court's capacity to categorize someone as a delinquent
without any ostensible acts now seems dubious under Gault's apparent
specific analogizing of juvenile procedures to criminal law.65 In terms
of requiring focus on specific allegations of "law violations" I would
contend that although acts are a sine qua non of a finding of delin-
sider the lawyer's experience In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1964). See for peculiarities Note, COL. L. REv., note 2 supra at 285-310.
61. For pre-Gault horrors see In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966); Kahm v.
People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928); Sharp v. State, 240 Miss. 629, 127 So. 2d 865 (1961);
One problem is always that of specificity.
62. In re Kenneth Lee Wylie, No. 4022 (D.C. Ct. App. June 30, 1967).
63. See generally, Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Ac-
cussed in a Quasi Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1966); State ex rel. Shaw v.
Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952) for an interesting analysis; In re Custody of a
Minor, 250 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957); In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (1967); In re Sanders,
166 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959); Marsden v. Commonwealth, 227 N.W.2d 1 (Mass.
1967); People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72 (1932) (Pound, C.J.). Compare, (Brennan, 1.) In re
Lewis 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953), where a boy who may have fallen asleep at the
wheel is sent to reform school for reckless driving on grounds trial court knows best what
to do with him. See also, Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) of "moral
turpitude" being defined by an accusation and prior convictions-just acts and reliance
are also involved.
64. Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
65. See Allen, note 2 supra, who maintains, in the law we talk of what a man is by
looking to proof of what he does. The presumption of innocence and propriety of family
raising would argue that acts, not differing assessments of morality, predicate state
intervention just as they would in criminal conviction and termination of parental
rights :. . . . . .. . . . .. . .
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quency, the whole purpose of the juvenile process is to treat juveniles'
acts not as crimes indicating character but as acts from which we may
find patterns to guide treatment. In any event, two points are clear:
A concept of delinquency is hard to deal with as a lawyer since it is a
description rather than a sharply focused fact, or a label based on
sharply defined fact. More important, it is difficult for a juvenile to
comprehend an investigation of delinquency dealing with acts, personal
description, and issues of specific "morality." In short, his whole charac-
ter and its weak spots receive a thorough assault from all directions.
What is at stake? What are the issues? What is being examined? What
does all this mean to him? If the lawyer is at sea, the juvenile drowns.
Allegation of Being Beyond Control
Thirdly, many cases come under the heading of "wayward minor,"
"beyond parental control," or the like. Sometimes petitions just allege
that a child is fast becoming uncontrollable by his parents. 66 Some-
times a parent reports that a child is misbehaving and the child is
then arrested and detained for a while until the parent at the time of
hearing signs a petition alleging that the child is "beyond control" or
asks for the return of the child.67 Sometimes the claim of lack of paren-
tal control is based on allegation of law violations, or founded on the
observation of others connected with the child.
What is to be beyond control? Sometimes a child is originally
examined by the court as a case of "beyond control" or "neglect," and
then found to be "delinquent" and sent to "training school." If we
presume innocence on the part of a child and conceive of him as
worthy of protection and not a hardened criminal, what does it mean
to characterize him as "beyond control?" If we conceive of him as
committing no crime does not a concept of "beyond control" usually
mean parental neglect or bad parental relationship-a failure of the
parent to carry out his main responsibility? Recently, the Court of
66. Sharp v. State, 240 Misc. 929, 127 So. 2d 865 (1961).
67. In the District of Columbia this furnishes a method of punishment. A parent calls
the court. The child is arrested and incarcerated. A hearing is held a month later. If the
parent wants the child back the punishment is generally over. The state's bars have done
the parent's bidding. If not, off to jail. In New York, it is sometimes supposed to be used
as a device to get psychiatric or social assistance but then all parental control is lost. The
author has had heart broken clients who in advice of many have filed such complaints
hoping to have auxilliary help and then were told "the Court has jurisdiction" and had
to beg to visit their children who wept and suffered to be away from home. Parents are
also told to file neglect petitions against other parents to. gain. custody.
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Appeals in the District of Columbia has approached this problem. In
a case where the lawyer sought an examination of the parental treat-
ment and this was summarily denied,6 the Juvenile Court made
findings of lack of parental care, being "beyond control," and habitual
truancy. 69 Since two elements were not charged in the petition, Gault's
requirement of notice was not satisfied. But the court noted the heart of
the problem in stating that in dealing with "beyond control," the
Juvenile Court should consider petitioner's argument that such a con-
clusion of "beyond control" is at odds with the finding that petitioner
was without adequate parental supervision.7 0 This statement is the
farthest any case has gone into inquiring into the concept of "beyond
control," explicitly recognizing that it had just begun to reach the
issue.
Since a finding of "beyond control" practically always means com-
mitment and confinement, when the child's status is due to parental
neglect, an anomalous situation is presented. Because the parent has
failed the juvenile is sent to what amounts to a jail.71 Yet often,
juvenile courts have jurisdiction over parental neglect7 2 so they can
punish by fine or even imprisonment or threaten it. Certainly, if a
court can change the parent's behavior or has a chance to do so, it
seems strange to ignore this alternative (as is usually done) and in-
stead to commit a child to an institution.
Once again, let us look at the effect on the infant or adolescent.
Arrayed against him are his parents and the officers of the state. He
feels, often justly, that his parent is at fault. He knows he risks im-
68. In re Elmore, No. 20, 497 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 1967) at n.19. Trial counsel filed a
Motion to Change Nature of proceedings with an Alternative Motion to Safeguard Con-
stitutional Rights protesting "Imposition of punishment for no specific act." Both denied.
69. Id. At an earlier proceeding the Juvenile Court had released the child in the
custody of the father. This was after mother's "beyond control" complaint. At trial the
father testified the boy was well behaved for him. Washington Star, Jan. 5, 1966 § B, p. 3.
The Juvenile Court never seemed troubled that "beyond control" was alleged by only one
parent when the statute talked of "parents." Trial transcript, In re Elmore, supra.
70. Id.
71. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRIcr OF COLUMBIA,
686-87 (1966).
72. In Arizona, for example, where Gault occurred, such jurisdiction obtains. See,
People v. Davis, 27 App. Div. 2d 299, 278 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1967). The ratio of cases of
delinquency to parental negligence is 3 to 1. Walther & McCune, note 11 supra at 47.
This article is written concerning the child. If the focus shifts to examination of neglect,
the issue of dealing with the child in an unacceptable environment still remains. See,
notes 67 supra 95, 98 infra. Also neglect may be as vacuous and dangerous a concept as
"beyond control." See note 7 supra. The issue is when can and should the state step into
the family and take over controls. Neither -the "beyond control" or "neglect" approach
deals with this difficult problem. The author is grateful to Edward V. Sparer for suggest-
ing and discussing this point.
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prisonment and .is being described as immoral. Yet often he has no
one to stand up for him.73 Here is the potentially most traumatic
situation of them all-in a court theoretically designed to protect him,
all the forces he knows attack him. In the author's opinion, "beyond
control" hearings and proceedings are the worst aspect of our juvenile
courts.
III. DISPOSITION
After the experience of the trial or hearing, the juvenile confronts a
determination of what is to be done with him. It is usually probation
or commitment.
Probation officers have very heavy case-loads and are paid badly.7 4
Often they are out of sympathy with their charges. As social workers
they seek mainly to impress society's values on their charges and as
court officers they seek to add to a sense of authority to abstract state
sanctions by lecturing, threatening, and insisting that their charges
report to them. A request to change parole officers is considered an
affront to the juvenile court system.75 In effect a probation officer is
another figure of authority who checks up and criticizes the juvenile
while not forming any real relationship with him. 'Yet when the
author has argued that a probation officer is bad, he has been ruled
"out of order"-yet any observer can see fear and resentment instead
of respect being produced in these situations.
Commitment is, in practice, a vague concept. In some cases, juvenile
courts lose direct control.7 6 The places to which children are com-
mitted are in general quite bad.77 Yet courts refuse to entertain com-
73. Marsden v. Commonwealth, 227 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1967). There is also the question
of separate counsel for juveniles. In re Custody of Minor, 250 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
In re Sipply, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953). Hopefully Gault will be applied to
mean such counsel is.
74. Or so they claim.
75. See oral argument in juvenile court, January, 1966 In re Clayton, made part of the
record for Clayton v. Stone, 358 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir., 1966).
76. D.C. Juvenile Court commits to the Welfare Department who then makes disposi-
tional decisions. See also Ex parte Newkosky, 94 N.J.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (1920).
77. See, note 68 supra. In re Elmore, No. 20, 497 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 1967); Creek v.
Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Consider these words in Kent: "worst of both worlds.
. . . Neither protection accorded to adults nor solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966). In re
Anonymous, 250 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1964), is Judge Polier's stinging decision after a "beyond
control" conviction "the girl in this case must be paroled to her parents in the absence of
any facility for her treatment and rehabilitation." See further, Fish v. Horn, 14 N.Y.2d
905 (1964). See, In re Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1966), for an example of a concerned
court finding the label "marriage" a convenient excuse for avoiding inadequate facilities.
Cf. 13th Amendment; Clancy and Weiss, note 10 supra; note 72 supra.
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plaints. Recently, in the District of Columbia the Court of Appeals
has noted this matter. It has stated that "(Juvenile) Court (is) obli-
gated to conduct an 'appropriate inquiry' when presented with a sub-
stantial complaint concerning commitment . . . In this case, we have,
on the one hand, an explicit finding by the juvenile court that peti-
tioner needs 'psychological and/or psychiatric care to meet his particu-
lar needs' while on the other, a claim that petitioner is receiving no
treatment whatever . . . we think the juvenile court will have need
for a full development of the salient facts which an evidentiary hear-
ing can afford ... ,,s noting that the juvenile court should attend to
any changes in status. This appears to be the furthest any appellate
court has gone.79
Here, then, is the final paradox. The point of juvenile proceedings
is to avoid criminal stigma and to afford meaningful personal con-
sideration. Yet after stripping away criminal and even civil pro-
cedures, juvenile courts offer no particular individual concern and
simply puts youth in what are tantamount to jails.80 Bars, overcrowd-
ing, mingling of ages, brutal guards are a common experience. The
justification is not only not fulfilled but also not attempted.
But beyond even this paradox lurk even more problems. With com-
mitment to a place of department, a juvenile is still not assured of
meaningful, stable or consistent treatment directed towards his "in-
adequacy" or "acts." First, although he has been committed to one
place, he may be transferred without a hearing to jails,"" training
schools, 2 or to places of maximum security.8 While the present sys-
tem seeks to justify the informality and summary nature of juvenile
proceedings on the quality of wise and fatherlike disposition, dis-
position turns out to be merely giving a juvenile over to people who
can ship him about, even to jails.8 4
Even then his woes may not be over. Because juvenile adjudications
are not denominated as criminal adjudications, even the protection of
78. Id., In re Elmore.
79. See also, Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 385 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
80. See, notes 70, 40, 2 supra.
81. In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966). See figures in Delinquent Children
in Penal Institutions, at 5 HEW 1964 and Court decisions summarized 12-20.
82. Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960); Cogdel v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 102
(D.D.C. 1959); In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 627
(D.D.C. 1954).
83. Marsden v. Commonwealth, 227 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1967).
84. Often Juvenile commitments are longer than a jail sentence could be for a con-
victed adult. See Gault, supra note 1 at 29.
608
Vol. 9: 590, 1971
-The Poor Kid
double jeopardy has been held inapplicable to some courts,8 5 but not
others.86 Hence when a juvenile became of adult age he is prosecuted
again. In some states, the juvenile incarceration can be extended upon
majority up to time of maximum adult sentence.87 Once again even
leaving the constitution and, fairness aside, being subjected to a trial
more than once for the same offense hardly seems rehabilitative to a
child theoretically receiving help from the juvenile court. A child who
has been treated to cure the causes and perhaps effects of an anti-social
act probably is seriously harmed by a later trial for that act, counter
to the rationale of the original trial and detention.
IV. BORDERLANDS
Moreover, even in the borderland of law, there exist further border-
lands. The first is that of age. Although the point of juvenile courts is
to protect the tender, it appears the courts use only a physical measure
of tenderness and maturity,88 and that is assessed often at trial rather
than at commencement of criminal process,8 9 that is, at arrest or peti-
tion (although there is a problem about the use of juvenile-obtained
evidence in adult courts).90 If the courts were wrong, however, in not
affording a juvenile trial in the first place, there is authority for not
sending the case back to juvenile court after some time has elapsed.9
Finally, there is the matter of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to the
adult criminal courts.92 After much dispute, the Supreme Court laid
85. See cases cited in Comment, U. PA. L. Rrv. note 2 supra at 1212-14. Such are the
dangers of a literal reading of the concept of a "non-criminal" proceeding. Some maintain
this problem is minor, but it reveals an attitude and when done achieves a great injustice.
86. Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963) and cases cited; Sawyer
v. Hauck, 245 F.Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965).
87. E.g. N.J. State. 2A:4-37(b)(2), (Supp. 1966); NJ. State. 2A:113-4 (Supp. 1966).
88. Such seems to be stated in all statutes. See State v. Gardner, 219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d
130 (1951). But an increase in age and body size does not necessarily imply more maturity
or intelligence. See P. WEISS, THE MAKING OF MEN (1967). If juvenile courts are to protect,perhaps the retarded, on their option, should have trials there, or adult courts graft on
juvenile protections when dealing with them. After all, the requirement of counsel is
more strictly observed for the dull of mind.
89. McLaren v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 31, 209 S.W. 669 (1919) quoted in Dendy v.
Wilson, 142 Tex. 640, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944). Yet the capacity and nature of a child at com-
mission of act seem relevant and meant for the Juvenile Court. Compare the game played
on the youth In re Sippy to keep control before she passed her 18th birthday.
90. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
91. Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155 (D. N.J. 1957). See comments note 89
supra.
92. See, for a summary of the stigma attached in waiving of certifying over, Note,
Separating the Criminal From the Delinquent: Due Process in Certification Procedure,
40 So. CAL. L. Ri v. 158, 162 (1967).
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this. matter somewhat to rest in the Kent 93 decision, holding that, at
least in the District of Columbia, there must be a full, procedurally
safeguarded hearing before juveniles are transferred from juvenile
court. proceedings to adult courts.94 One could once again query
putting youths through such an elaborate process. If there is a good
chance they need tender treatment do we give it by adding a full
waiver hearing to a trial?
It might be well to note again that the decisions and doctrines
-throughout involve two conflicting clich6s or principles: These of the
state parens patraie and parental rights. Exclusive reliance on the for-
mer would lead not only to ignoring parents' motives in having a
family but also allow for intrusion into the family-against both
the constitution and societal stability. Exclusive reliance on the latter
would lead to possibilities of maimed children, distorted perspectives,
etc. Although a philosophic excurus is unnecessary here as the prin-
ciples discussed deal with goals and effects of the present system, let
me suggest that a resolution should be found in a court's recognition
first, of children's rights as individuals; second, to the degree com-
-patible with the first, of parental freedoms; third, of whatever limita-
tions in nature or practice the court faces in implementation, since
the law cannot probe minds. The court should then function under
clear rules in this defined area of its competence.
V. CONCLUSION
In the jungle of juvenile law, the removal of constitutional and
criminal safeguards, even if justifiable because of particularized and
.helpful treatment (not "criminal sanction"), is supposed to follow ad-
judication. But this has not been the case. The discretion granted has
meant abuse of power and confusion of process. Yet remedies do exist:
1. Issuance of commands or requests to families should be super-
vised by the juvenile court, which should articulate a reason for the
decision. The courts should seek to protect individual rights and family
sanctity. Perhaps misbehaving officials should be liable in tort.
2. No police officer should be allowed to stop or detain a juvenile
93. Note that in some jurisdictions there is no right to appeal from juvenile court
decisions. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57-59 (1967). Seenote 7 supra.94. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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except to prevent him from damaging property or person 95-and actual
knowledge of this should be required. Any other arrest should be made
by juvenile officers, who also should be called on immediately in cases
of detention by a police officer. All arrests should be made as gently and
verbally as possible.
3. The instant the state processes affect a juvenile, he and his family
should receive a written description of what is to be encountered, the
nature, meaning, implication, and possible results of each step of the
process. A social worker should arrive as soon as possible and explain
to the family and the child precisely how the state's interest arose and
what will occur. 96 Where there is conflict between child and family
each should have its own guide. A lawyer, devoted entirely to the
juvenile's interest should be offered to accompany the child through
every step of the process starting at the same time as the initial act
of state expression of concern for the juvenile.9 7 Preliminary detention
should be abolished. 98 In cases where parental action indicates neglect
an immediate hearing on additional custody might be held.
4. The only things a juvenile should be tried for are specific acts of
law violation. He should receive all traditional criminal safeguards in
the process. 99
5. "Beyond control" hearings should be abolished as an ugly, mis-
directed, and destructive procedure.
6. A finding of delinquency should be made only at a special hear-
ing concerned with past acts proved.100
95. Specific statutory permission to handle runaways or lost infants could be formulated
if necessary. Note that the total number of juvenile officers in cities over 10,000 is only
3,033. Staff and Training for Juvenile Law Enforcement in Urban Police Departments,
at 9. (Juvenile Delinquency Facts Facets No. le, HEW 1960).
96. Literature of course should be geared to child's age. See P. Weiss, note 88 supra.
97. A type of neighborhood legal aid child organization could so provide.
98. In cases where parental action indicates neglect an immediate hearing on additional
custody might be held commensurate with parental rights. See generally, Simpson, The
Unfit Parent, Conditions Under Which a Child May be Adopted without Consent of His
Parent, 39 U. DELr. L. REv. 290 (1967). On the question of a child's future appearance in
the court, let us note that both school and home tie him to the community. A social
worker could aid his actual going. If the child is absent from home the procedure should
be to locate a good environment for him which he will accept. If absent from school, an
investigation of remedies should occur.
99. See text, accompanying notes 40-65 supra. Also, no commitment should ever extend
past maximum adult sentence or some lesser figure, say 10 years (plenty of time for
rehabilitation) and no conditions affecting constitutional freedoms should ever be
allowed.
100. At this point it might be appropriate to inquire into the possibility that anti-social
behavior is the psychologically healthiest for a young slum dweller and to also inquire
as to whether some acts of civil disobedience aren't rational and justifiable. See the
probing treatment of Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. REv.
175 (1967). On the other hand, specific horrifying crimes such as rape might be statutorily
defined so one act could lead to such an inquiry as to general "criminal" nature if there
is such a thing.
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7. Disposition should be made at a special hearing after a finding of
delinquency and should result in specific aids specifically enlisted for
juveniles. Considerations to the effect of the whole process on him
should be brought to bear.' 0'
If all these forms could be undertaken, children who deserve the
Constitutional protections 102 could, commensurate with the expensive
implications of Gault, and to a lesser extent Winship,'0  make the
now-forlorn pronouncement of an optimistic district judge that juve-
nile law was designed to increase, not diminish safeguards'04 into an
acceptable reality. Suffering children deserve no less.
101. See In re Johnson, 174 N.E.2d 967 (1961).
102. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). Cf., Mazur v. Lazarus, 196 A.2d
471 (1964): In re Kroll 43 A.2d 706 (1945).
103. Gault could be read as laying down the policy of introducing procedural safe-
guards across the board. But all that glitters is not Gault.
104. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
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